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et al.: Panel 2: Justice Kennedy's Prose — Style and Substance

PANEL 2: JUSTICE KENNEDY’S PROSE—STYLE
AND SUBSTANCE
MODERATOR: ERIC SEGALL
PANELISTS: ERIC BERGER, MICHAEL DORF, AND JAMAL
GREENE
Professor Eric Segall: Our next panel is going to be devoted to
Justice Kennedy’s—I think we would all agree—unique writing style
and how that maybe, or maybe not, affected the substance of his
opinions. Our guests are Jamal Greene of Columbia Law School,
Mike Dorf of Cornell Law School, and Eric Berger of the University
of Nebraska, and I do want to mention that this is a little bit special.
In that many, many—not that many—years ago, Eric was Mike’s
pupil at Columbia Law School, so we have a teacher and a pupil on
the stage here. Although, Eric has definitely graduated from that—
Professor Michael Dorf: —student has become the master.
Professor Eric Berger: Definitely not.
Professor Segall: I do want to begin this panel by reading two of
Justice Kennedy’s passages, so we get the flavor of what we’re going
to talk about for the next hour and fifteen minutes. Perhaps his most
famous, or infamous, paragraph or sentence comes from the Casey
opinion, where he wrote, “At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life,”1 which is a sentence that angered many,
many formalists and people on the right. I will say that he said
something very similar to that during his confirmation hearing, so he
wasn’t hiding the ball.

1

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851

(1992).
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This is what he said in Obergefell, and this is longer, and so bear
with me, but I think it’s important, again, to understand Justice
Kennedy’s unique writing style. He wrote, “No union is more
profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love,
fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union,
two people become something greater than once they were. As some
of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a
love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these
men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their
plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to
find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned
to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest
institutions. They ask for equal dignity . . . .”2
I guess my first question is, is it possible to imagine any other
Supreme Court Justice writing either of those two passages?
Professor Greene: I’ll start, I guess. I do think it’s unique to Justice
Kennedy, and I talk about this exercise with my students. When you
read the Casey opinion, which is written by three different Justices,
and there are three different styles in the different parts of the
opinion, and you don’t really need to know for sure who wrote
which—you don’t really need to know for sure who wrote which
opinion if you know something about the Justices. You can tell that
the “sweet mystery of life” stuff is Justice Kennedy. Even without
knowing about the doctrinal history of undue burden, you’ll know
that’s Justice O’Connor. If you look at Justice Souter’s writing style,
you’ll know where that shows up in the opinion as well, stare decisis
discussion especially, so I can’t imagine anyone in the modern Court
writing in just the way that Justice Kennedy wrote, but there is a
certain aspect of his writing that is kind of reminiscent of 19th
century Supreme Court style. This is what Grant Gilmore sort of
called “the grand style.”

2

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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Professor Segall: They want you to talk into your mic a little more, I
think.
Professor Greene: Right here next to my mouth.
Professor Segall: Okay. Alright.
Professor Greene: Maybe I’ll do—it is on, but something about
the—okay, that’s better. So, there is an aspect of his style that I think
mimics some of what you would have seen 150 years ago. I can
imagine—putting to one side the actual issues in the case—I can
imagine John Marshall speaking somewhat like Justice Kennedy.
Professor Dorf: I guess, so I agree with Jamal about that. I would
add you might think of other prose stylists on the Supreme Court, so
in the 19th century you looked to Marshall, you looked to Story.
Outside of Dred Scott and a few other horrible decisions, Taney was
actually quite a stylist.
In the 20th century, we tend to think about Holmes and Brandeis
from the early 20th century. Jackson is considered possibly the
greatest writer of all time on the Supreme Court. He had phrases a
little bit like Kennedy’s, although they tended to be less—
Professor Segall: That’s Jamal.
Professor Dorf: Jackson’s great lines also had that way of using
metaphors and so forth—talking about the loaded weapon lying
around in his Korematsu dissent, the language in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette waxes eloquent. So in that sense,
yeah, I agree. There are precursors to Justice Kennedy in this kind of
grand style.
I do think it’s worth noting a difference between the two passages
you quoted. The language from Obergefell, while emotional, is
mostly rational, right? I don’t mean the Casey language is irrational;
it’s just that you could be talking about anything. By contrast, you
can criticize the Obergefell language, as people have done, on the
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ground that it’s saying that single people are going to be condemned
to a life of loneliness. That’s pretty harsh, but pointing this out is a
criticism of the substance. As far as the language itself, I tend to
think of the Obergefell language as just a peroration that follows
linearly in a way that the so-called sweet mystery of life passage
from Casey does not. The Casey language is just pure rhetoric.
Professor Berger: I don’t have a whole lot to add. I agree with what
both Jamal and Mike said. The grand, almost quasi-poetic
philosophical gestures toward big ideas sound more like some of the
19th century Justices. One Justice it reminds me a tiny bit of is
Cardozo. I think Cardozo was a better writer than Justice Kennedy,
but he would also sometimes gesture towards these big ideas and at
the end of the opinion you’re not exactly sure what the doctrine is,
which ties back to what the first panel was talking about: Justice
Kennedy was often less doctrinally moored than many of the other
Justices.
Professor Segall: I guess I should be careful to add, because even
though I think Jamal is right about Casey, hyper technically we don’t
know that Justice Kennedy wrote the mystery of life passage,
because it’s a three-Justice opinion. We know he wrote it, but we
don’t know he wrote it in that sense.
Justice Scalia has said throughout his career that he wrote his
dissents for law students. He really did say that, and I think it turned
out to be, for better or for worse, an excellent strategy for Justice
Scalia. Who do we think Justice Kennedy was writing for?
Professor Greene: I think he’s writing for the—I mean, in very
broad terms, and Mike’s out in his chamber, so he’d have more to say
about this, but for the history books. People talk about Donald Trump
picking Justices or picking a Secretary of Defense because they look
the part. I get the sense that Justice Kennedy wanted his opinions to
look the part. If there was something that, there’s a certain style that a
Supreme Court opinion’s supposed to express, and I don’t know that
it’s necessarily the public or law students in any specific sense, but

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss5/2
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rather that he thought there was a kind of institutional style that he
wanted, especially in the rights cases, he wanted the cases to look
like. Maybe that’s a little bit inchoate, but that’s my sense.
Professor Dorf: Justice Kennedy liked to talk to groups of
students—he still does, especially high school students—and tell
them about the glories of the Constitution. But in big cases—not in
an ERISA case where he’ll just follow the doctrine—but in a case
where there’s going to be a lot of public debate, I think he was quite
consciously trying to speak to the people broadly. There’s a tension
between the anti-doctrinalism that everyone on the first panel talked
about and this grandiloquent style because the anti-doctrinalism
works well in reaching the general public but the grandiosity does
not. The public doesn’t know about or care about the three-part test,
with the sub prongs and so forth. They want to know is this a denial
of equality or liberty? Abandoning the formal tests makes sense if
that’s your goal.
However, the style we’re talking about now, which critics would
call pompous, doesn’t work especially well in reaching the general
public, and so maybe Jamal’s right in that maybe it’s not aimed at
them. But insofar as I think one of Justice Kennedy’s goals—and a
laudable goal—was to speak to “the People” with a capital P, that
makes sense of the anti-doctrinalism. It doesn’t make sense of this
style.
Professor Berger: Yeah, I think it depends somewhat on which
opinion. I think in an opinion like Lawrence, for instance, I think
very much he was trying to talk to the people, talk to readers of the
New York Times, and things like that. I agree with the tension Mike
talked about between the anti-doctrinal style and the grand
philosophical style.
Mike and I had a conversation about this the other day. I think one
of the reasons why he might be anti-doctrinal is it’s hard to speak in
doctrine if you’re also making grandiose, quasi-poetic gestures, so
there’s a sort of tension between those.
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Now, I suppose you could be rigidly and precisely doctrinal in one
part of the opinion and write in grand philosophical sweeping
gestures in another part of the opinion, but there is a tension between
those styles, and if you try to put all of it in, the opinions would be
even longer than they already are.
Professor Greene: Well, Casey is that. It’s just that, right? It’s
grandiloquent for a few paragraphs, and then it’s really minute and
brass tacks at other points. Of course, it’s written by three different
people, so that makes some sense, and there’s a question of whether
that hangs together. I think Casey—the seams are very obvious in
Casey, and it’s I think a bigger challenge in a shorter opinion.
Professor Segall: Justice Scalia was able to write in the doctrinal,
formalist framework—but we can debate whether he was that—but
he wrote in that way, yet he was able to write in a way that most
people think the style is very effective, leaving aside his big insults,
and he was able to fit in his own unique style into the formalist
framework. So, I’m not sure I agree that Justice Kennedy couldn’t
have been both a formalist and a writer with a poetic style. I think
that is possible, so I’m wondering if one is driving the other, or if
they are two separate things.
Professor Berger: Well, I wouldn’t call Justice Scalia’s style poetic.
I think he was an excellent writer, and I think, actually, some of
Justice Kennedy’s poetic gestures probably don’t qualify as very
good poetry, so I guess I would disagree to the extent that I think part
of what made Justice Scalia such a good communicator—and I think
the same is true today, maybe to a somewhat lesser extent, of Justice
Kagan and the Chief Justice—is they’re good at writing very direct,
snappy, to-the-point prose that is very readable. And I think that
actually speaks to the public better than some of Justice Kennedy’s
grander language—the passage from Casey you quoted, for instance.
Professor Dorf: I totally agree with that. I think about news reports
on NPR after the Court has decided a case—it’s too bad Nina
Totenberg isn’t here, because I would ask her about this—but, how
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you decide what to read, what to quote from the opinions? Because
what’ll happen typically is, I’ll have read the opinion when it came
down at 10:00 in the morning, and then when I’m driving home and
listening to the news, I’ll hear Nina read a passage.
It’s true that if it were a Kagan or Scalia opinion or dissent, you
might hear her quote those snippets, but she was sure to quote the
grand Kennedy language, and so if your goal is to reach the public—
the public are not reading the opinions. SCOTUSblog has a lot of
followers, but it has a lot of followers for law. It’s law famous. It’s
not real famous, and so people are getting it on the news, and so it
may well be that you’re trying to write to get quoted either on All
Things Considered, the evening news, or however people are getting
their news.
Professor Segall: This is a question I’ve thought about and I, to be
honest, haven’t figured out how to phrase it exactly, but I do wonder
if we have opinions about whether Justice Kennedy to some degree—
this is the critique that came at him from the right—thought himself
more as a philosopher-king than a judge. More someone whose job it
is to espouse broad, moral, ethical, dignitary-type principles than
what we—Justice Nahmias is nodding at me, I just want to make that
point—than someone who’s applying law to fact and trying to do
that. Any thoughts on that?
Professor Greene: Well, I think—and Justice Kennedy I assume
would say the same thing—I think it begs the question to say that
doing what Justice Kennedy is doing is not being a judge, or is not to
say that the job of a judge in a constitutional case involving rights,
and rights that are not well-specified in the Constitution, that seem to
be implementing some kind of value commitment or set of values, to
say that the job of a judge in that case is to mechanically or
formalistically apply law to fact is to state a substantive position
within the case itself. It’s not to state a universal premise about
judging, at least not in constitutional cases.
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Constitutional judging, I think, is part of the flaw of American
legal academia, that we reflexively think about constitutional judging
as completely continuous with all other kinds of judging, as if it’s
just a contract case is just the same as deciding about abortion rights,
or something like that. They’re really different tasks, and we can talk
about whether we think that judges should be deciding these more
momentous sorts of cases, but the fact of the matter is we have a
Constitution, and the Constitution is not self-explanatory. So yes,
Justice Kennedy I do think thought a part of his job was to speak to
the values in the Constitution in a way that wasn’t particularly
formalistic or mechanistic, but I think, again, I don’t know that’s
necessarily inconsistent with judging.
Professor Dorf: One of the things that people object to when calling
a particular Justice a philosopher-king is that the Justice under
criticism tends to vote to strike down more laws than the critic thinks
is appropriate. And so that’s a particularly likely charge against
Justice Kennedy, who in that sense was the least restrained Justice of
anybody who sat on the Court with him—maybe any Justice ever—in
that he’s with the liberals in the abortion and gay rights cases, he’s
very strongly in favor of striking laws down under the First
Amendment, he’s with the conservatives in striking down laws on
federalism grounds. So he has an all-of-the-above approach, and so
that makes him “criticizable” on those grounds.
But again, just as we can distinguish between the anti-doctrinalism
and the reach for the poetic style, we can also distinguish between
both of those two and the tendency to want to strike things down. So
if you do the math, there are eight possible combinations of those
three things, assuming that each of them is yes or no. Justice
Kennedy was (1) an anti-doctrinalist and (2) a would-be poet, who
(3) tended to elevate his view of the Constitution over a more
restrained view of deference to elected officials. Do the answers to all
three of those questions tend to go together? I think that there’s
something to that. I don’t think they logically must go together, but
they do reinforce each other.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss5/2
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Professor Berger: I don’t have a whole lot to add to that. I agree
entirely with Mike that, of all the Justices in contemporary times, he
clearly was the one who was least deferential to the government and
most likely to strike things down. I also find him in a way the most
inscrutable of the Justices, though I don’t know if it’s because he
thought of himself as a philosopher-king, or because he liked to say
in a close case the tiebreaker goes to liberty without providing a real
sense of what that means. I don’t know if he thought of himself as a
philosopher-king or saw the Court’s role as really protecting
individuals from government overreach in all the different areas that
Mike mentioned.
Professor Segall: Well, let’s talk about Jamal’s point a little more.
This might be a little bit off the point, but it was such an interesting
point. I want to talk about it. Is it possible to decide hard
constitutional cases in a way that is honestly doctrinal? It turns out
Justice Scalia struck down—I just researched this—131 laws during
his career. That’s a lot of laws for someone who claimed to be
somewhat deferential to the political process. Now, Kennedy did
strike down more, but the numbers aren’t that different. Scalia and
Thomas strike down a lot of laws in their way. But, is it possible—is
constitutional law, “law?” Let me just put it that way, because I think
to Justice Kennedy, I’m not sure constitutional law was law. I’m
taking them by surprise. I didn’t—
Professor Greene: —This is a big question.
Professor Segall: Yes. It’s a big conference.
Professor Greene: Yeah, so I don’t think it’s possible to—so if
we’re going to state the terms of the claim in fairly simplistic ways—
so is it possible to do constitutional law in a way that, broadly
speaking, is rule oriented, which is to say the Constitution establishes
a set of rules that tell you exactly how to decide a case based on some
premise that can be established at the outset of the case. So, as
opposed to in some qualitative sense trying to apply a set of value
judgements to the facts before you, is it possible to do that? I don’t
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see why not. Is it possible to do it in a way that is free of reasonable
criticism? No. Of course not, because we are going to reasonably
disagree about which rules the Constitution actually establishes, the
level of generality at which to understand those rules and so forth. So
constitutional law is inherently contested. I guess what I would say,
and I guess what’s responsive to this, is to say I don’t think it’s
possible to persuade reasonable people, all reasonable people, that
what one is doing in constitutional law is compelled by the
Constitution—by its text, by its structure, by its original
understanding, or something along those lines. And so perhaps
there’s a sense in which Justice Kennedy’s writing style and the way
in which he expressed himself made that more obvious than for
someone like Justice Scalia.
Justice Kennedy was, and you talked about this at the earlier panel
in talking about his resistance to originalism—part of that is simply
to say he resists the notion that the Constitution is necessarily
determined in a way that is accessible to everyone, all at the same
time. He’s not a rule-oriented Justice in that sense. He is a Justice
who believes in what you might call the major premises of
constitutional law. He’s all about saying the Constitution protects
liberty, or the Constitution protects federalism, or freedom of speech
means a certain thing. For him, that drove a lot of the cases. So in
that sense, he shares that feature with rule-oriented Justices, so that
you can state the major premise, and the minor premise is not quite as
important to the decision. He wasn’t formalistic in that sense, so he
did believe that you can state those rules at a very broad level of
generality.
Professor Dorf: I believe that conflict is more interesting than
agreement, so I’m going to challenge you on this Eric. This picks up
on not your most recent book, but an earlier book, where you claim
that the Supreme Court is not a court. The claim is—you argue it
mostly based on constitutional cases—but the claim, broadly, I think,
could apply to the Supreme Court and its statutory cases. It’s just the
stakes are lower there, because Congress can overrule them.
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As I read you, you’re not a full-on critic who thinks that law isn’t
law. You just think that law at the Supreme Court level isn’t law, or
constitutional law at the Supreme Court level isn’t law, and so there’s
an easy test for that, right? Both Justices Scalia and Kennedy were
appeals court judges before they were Supreme Court Justices.
Kennedy was for a longer period of time, but each of them wrote a
substantial number of appeals court opinions. One way you could
figure out whether the Supreme Court is just making stuff up in a
way that’s different from what judges do generally is to compare and
contrast their opinions as Supreme Court Justices versus as appeals
court judges. I haven’t done that, but I would be surprised, if you
focused on big cases, because there are fewer of them in the appeals
court, because there’s a right of appeal to the appeals court, you don’t
have discretion or jurisdiction, but I would be surprised if there is a
very substantial difference. I think that both of them wrote more or
less the way they did all along. They got more comfortable in their
role as they got older. They knew that they couldn’t be reversed at
the Supreme Court, but I suspect that this was the way he was all
along.
Professor Segall: I will say that Justice Kennedy on the Ninth
Circuit had to write an opinion upholding the military’s dismissal of
a gay person that he would never have had to write, and would not
have written, had he been on the Supreme Court. I would also say
that Judge Posner, who publicly criticized the Heller gun decision
very strongly—really criticized it—struck down an Illinois law
restricting guns, and he has told me that he felt he had to do that. I
think the difference between the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals always is, always has been, the Supreme Court never has to
do anything.
Professor Dorf: Kennedy did not have to do exactly that, because a
majority of Ninth Circuit judges in the Watkins en banc case ruled
against the military. But of course I agree that lower court judges are
bound by Supreme Court precedent in a way that Supreme Court
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Justices aren’t, but if we’re talking about the overall style I don’t
think it changes much from the appeals court to the Supreme Court.
Professor Berger: Well, so two quick points. First, a response to
your back and forth, and then second to your question from several
minutes ago. As to your back and forth, this is stating the obvious,
but I think one major difference between the role of an appellate
court judge or district court judge and the Supreme Court Justice is
that at the Supreme Court most of the cases that get there, especially
in the constitutional area, because they’re hard. By “hard,” I mean
that there are good arguments on both sides and that people are going
to disagree about them, whereas at the appellate court level you’re
more likely to have at least a substantial portion of the cases be cases
that regardless of your political norms and preferences, the law is
going to be pretty clear how it’s going to come out. Obviously, there
are exceptions to that, and some of those exceptions go up to the
Supreme Court, but I do think that is the difference between the roles
of different courts. And, this plays into the perception—to your
argument in your book—that the Supreme Court is not a court. I
think there are other reasons for that too, but one reason is the
Supreme Court decides a universe of cases without obvious right
answers, so you’re much more likely to see the Justices’ norms
infused in it.
On your previous question, maybe I’m twisting it somewhat, but
you asked about honesty, and one thing that I think is interesting
about Justice Kennedy’s opinions—maybe I’m defining honesty in a
particularly narrow way here—but I think one mark of honesty is
recognizing in these Supreme Court cases that there are difficult
arguments on both sides of the ledger, and even if you’re pretty sure
you’re right, there could be arguments on the other side. I think
sometimes Justice Kennedy was actually pretty good at that, and
sometimes he was pretty bad at it. I think that’s interesting. In cases
like Obergefell and Masterpiece Cakeshop, he actually did—
regardless of how you think those cases came down—he did a pretty
good job of recognizing the values on the other side. In Obergefell,
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he said recognition of same sex marriage does not demean those
people who disagree with it, and people disagree with it for
honorable reasons, and that isn’t necessarily bigotry.
But then in other cases, he seemed completely dismissive of the
values on the other side. So, I think in a case like Citizens United, he
gave really short shrift to the anti-corruption interest of the
government that Justice Stevens focused on in dissent.
And in a case like Rosenberger, he really saw that as a case about
viewpoint discrimination and brushed aside the Establishment Clause
issue, so much so that Justice O’Connor in her concurrence said,
“Well, I agree in the outcome, but this is a much harder case than
you’re making it. You’re pretending this is straightforward, but
platitudes shouldn’t be deciding a case.” So I think that’s interesting.
On the other one hand he sometimes goes out of his way to honestly
recognize that the values on the losing side have some legitimacy,
and in other cases he seems pretty myopic to those competing values.
Professor Greene: Just a follow-up on that and a follow-up on this
previous discussion about whether the Supreme Court is a court. I
totally agree with Eric that with Justice Kennedy there was an odd
mix of being totally sure that his view was the right view—I think
Citizens United is the best example of that—and being unusually
good, I think, at recognizing the range of rights or range of interests
on both sides of a question. I think Parents Involved he does that. I
think Masterpiece Cakeshop he does that. I think Obergefell he does
that, as well. And maybe this is just something about what I guess
Mark talked about at the previous panel about limits of empathy, but
I think in Justice Kennedy’s defense, I think this is something that
was good about him. I think his impulse was to say we should be
clear about when there are interests and values that are in conflict that
are on both sides. We should be honest and transparent about the fact
that a case is a difficult case. So he wasn’t a Justice who thought that
he should be writing a brief, where you just pretend that the
arguments all point in one direction. But I do think he was unable to
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see the range of interest in certain kinds of cases. Just like we all are,
but we’re able to point out his particular blind spots.
Just a small point on the law and courts—whether the Supreme
Court’s a court—question. It might be worth bringing up and
re-raising the question you asked at the previous panel about Webster
and Casey. So why does Justice Kennedy go from one view in
Webster to a different view in Casey? It’s a concurring opinion in the
first instance and the controlling opinion in the other instance. And so
one of the possibilities that one has to bear in mind is Justice
Kennedy thinks that his role is in fact different and that in fact he
actually has an obligation to adhering to a certain set of institutional
norms, a certain sense of continuity when he’s in one role versus
another role, even within the Court. So that, I think, is suggestive of,
not conclusive—we don’t know what’s going through his head—but
suggestive of the view that even though the Court doesn’t have to do
anything in the sense that someone’s going to make them or overturn
them, but in a sense that the court does have a certain set of
obligations and commitments that I think he took very seriously.
Professor Berger: Just really quickly. Another example of that I
think would be Fisher, which is a case where based on what he’d
written, or how he wrote in the past, I would have guessed that he
would have been the vote to strike down affirmative action, but when
he was actually in that position, unwilling to take that step. Maybe
realizing that—
Professor Segall: I just want to say very quickly because Mike
brought it up—not me—that the central, one-sentence thesis of that
book was one thing we expect all judges of law to do is take prior
law minimally seriously, that they are not expected to engage in
all-things-considered decision making, there is some minimal
requirement of prior law being taken seriously, and my empirical
thesis of that book was we can show the Supreme Court, as an
institution, has never taken prior law minimally seriously, and in the
context of—I don’t want to debate that here. We can if you want, but
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I will say that Justice Kennedy, I think, is a grand example of
someone who maybe didn’t take prior law all that seriously when
deciding what result he was going to reach. Do you think that’s an
untrue statement?
Professor Dorf: Yes. I think you’re not accounting for what Eric
[Berger] talked about, which is the selection bias. You’re looking at
the stuff that’s on the surface. The cases that make it to the Supreme
Court. There’s a gigantic, stable body of law—Marbury, McCulloch,
et cetera—that Kennedy might have disagreed with as an initial
matter. That he’s not going to take—
Professor Segall: Not Marbury. Kennedy would not disagree with
him.
Professor Dorf: One reason maybe why he’s sympathetic to the
other side in some cases and not in others, is that he’s just being
honest. I once heard about a judge who said, “When I hear a case,
sometimes it’s 51 to 49, but when I write the opinion it’s 100 to
nothing.”
Let me suggest that for Kennedy, if he heard it 51 to 49, he would
write it 51 to 49, but that doesn’t mean he’s being especially
sympathetic to the other side. It means he finds it’s a hard case. If
he’s writing at 100 to nothing, it’s because he thinks it’s an easy case,
even though some of us might think it’s a hard case, and so the real
challenge would be to write the opinion that’s sympathetic to the
other side when you think it’s a 100-to-nothing case. I’m having a
hard time thinking of examples of that from him, or really from
anybody.
Professor Berger: I think that, I could be wrong, but I think that
anecdote is something Justice White allegedly told to Justice
Blackmun. Justice Blackmun had written a waffling, on-the-onehand, on-the-other opinion. Justice White said, “Never write it that
way. Always write it as though it’s 100 to nothing.”
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I tend to think that one of the problems with judicial rhetoric at the
Supreme Court, and this alludes to something Jamal said, is that they
write it, the opinions are written too much like briefs, and they leave
it to the others, to the dissent, to make the other side. So I applaud
Justice Kennedy in cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop and Obergefell
for at least recognizing that there are competing interests on the other
side. Similarly, in a case like Boumediene when he said, “Well, the
history here isn’t determinative, so we need to look to other things.”
I think Mike’s probably right, and that helps explain Jamal’s point,
that in some cases he didn’t acknowledge the other side, because he
just couldn’t see it. And I think that’s part of why he’s inscrutable, is
he tended to put things in particular boxes, but it was just hard to
know in advance which box he’d put a case into. Like in the Janus
case this year. You could have seen that as a case about employee
speech, following the Garcetti line, but he didn’t see it in that box,
and who knows—
Professor Segall: I want to push back strongly on the inscrutable
point for Justice Kennedy. In Boumediene, which was the case
involving habeas corpus rights for Guantanamo Bay alleged
terrorists, there’s a sentence where Justice Kennedy says, “We’re
trying to decide what the reach of habeas corpus is.” Justice Kennedy
says, “Formalism cannot resolve this question,” and he really
believed that I think, in that case. Now, he may have been also
responding to Scalia’s dissent, which I think he did a lot.
Justice Kennedy much more often than not put his nonlegal, I
think nonlegal, value judgements front and center. So, the same-sex
marriage opinions are mostly about dignity and different ways of
describing that. The term limits case of the 1990s, which the young
people in this room—I can’t explain what a big issue term limit was
in 1990s. This was really one of the biggest issues in American
politics. Arkansas put term limits on its members of Congress, and
the Court was divided, and Justice Stevens, of all people, writes a
40-page opinion going through text, history, and traditional tools,
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saying they’re unconstitutional. Justice Thomas writes a 40-page
opinion going through history and text, saying they are constitutional,
and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion spends a couple of
paragraphs on the Founding, but then he says—he puts his value
judgment right there and says Congress needs to have a separate
identity from the states for these reasons. And we’re going to talk
about that later this afternoon.
Professor Dorf: It also contains his best line of poetry in any
Supreme Court opinion. Describing the system of federalism, he
says, “The Framers split the atom of sovereignty,” which is, I think, a
legitimately great line.
Professor Segall: Right. I agree with that, so my question is—
Professor Dorf: Eugene doesn’t agree.
Professor Segall: Eugene? We’ll get to him later. My question, when
you said inscrutable, I think, and I’ve written, he is the most scrutable
Justice of the last, my lifetime, because he didn’t, and this gets back
to the conversation we’re having, he did not hide behind doctrine to
mask the value judgements he thought decided the case. In that sense,
I’m going to say this again, I apologize, he and Judge Posner share a
great similarity. Neither one hid behind doctrine to justify their
results in a case. So, two questions. Is that accurate? You can
disagree, and is it a good thing, if it is accurate?
Professor Greene: I guess I would say I don’t think that Justice
Kennedy hid behind doctrine, so I think I agree with that. Whether
that is a mark of unusual honesty or transparency, that’s where I
might get off the train. Insofar as, I don’t think there’s any
particular—from the perspective of honesty or transparency, I don’t
think there’s any particular valance to being a doctrinalist versus a
non-doctrinalist. So, you can do what Justice Kennedy does, which,
as I said, is state a set of major premises, and then say here’s what
follows from these major premises without getting too wedded to the
particular details of separating yourself from doctrine in a way that is
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entirely nontransparent. I think when Eric says it’s inscrutable, it’s
because we don’t know how you get from Citizens United, when you
say, “Okay, corporations have certain speech rights, it’s not good to
discriminate on the basis of the speaker.” Jumping from that to a
restriction on electioneering in the last thirty days before an election
that says you can speak through a separate PAC but can’t speak from
your general treasury funds is obviously unconstitutional. That’s not
an obvious premise at all, an obvious conclusion at all. He doesn’t
tell us how he gets there. In Citizens United there’s no discussion at
all of in what way are PACs burdensome to set up, for example.
That should be relevant to the decision in a way that it just isn’t,
because for Justice Kennedy the conclusion just follows from the
premise of liberty and speech. So, I don’t know that I’d describe that
as particularly transparent. I do agree that he doesn’t hide behind
doctrine in any obvious way. I think one thing that separates him
from Posner though, and this does speak to transparency a bit, and is
I think, to Posner’s credit, at least from the vantage of transparency,
which I don’t know is necessarily—it’s not an obviously great value
for a judge, but we can get back to that, but—
Professor Segall: Say that again, sorry.
Professor Greene: It’s not obvious that judges should always be
transparent. I don’t know that that’s—they shouldn’t necessarily be
maximizing transparency in writing decisions, but that’s a separate
point. Posner is clear that he is not bound by doctrine. He will tell
you that. He says, “This is my philosophy. I don’t believe in
doctrine.” Kennedy doesn’t say that. We have to just sort of read that
into his opinions. And I think that’s a significant difference when we
talk about transparency. Is Kennedy—sometimes he’s bound to
doctrine. Sometimes he isn’t, and he doesn’t tell us how that’s driven
by any set of philosophical premises. You just have to sort of figure it
out by reading his cases.
Professor Segall: Posner did say that he would check to see if his
result was blocked by a Supreme Court precedent. Go ahead Mike.
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Professor Dorf: Or Circuit precedent. So, there have been lots and
lots of Justices and judges who are not formalists, right? Indeed, it’s
conventional wisdom that we are all legal realists to a point, and then
the question is to what point? One of the interesting questions about
Justice Kennedy, with respect to the lack of doctrine in some of the
cases, is why he did it, given how easy it would have been in any of
those cases to write a much more straightforward opinion reaching
the same result using the standard doctrinal formulations.
Indeed, after Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down the Texas ban
on same-sex sodomy, there were a whole series of lower court cases
as to whether the case made same-sex, or opposite-sex, intimate
sexual relations a fundamental right. And so there was litigation over
a sex-toys ban in which, I believe it was the Eleventh Circuit, said no,
it wasn’t a fundamental right, and they cited passages in Kennedy’s
opinion in Lawrence. If he had just said that it wasn’t, it would have
been easy. And, in fact, after the case, Larry Tribe wrote a piece in
the Harvard Law Review on Lawrence, referring to the “fundamental
right that dare not speak its name.” Tribe showed how passage by
passage Kennedy actually used the language that we normally
associate with the doctrine of fundamental rights, but he scrambled it
up like it was a word jumble, so it didn’t have the exact formula.
Why did he do that?
I confess, I don’t know the answer to that question. One hypothesis
might be that if you’re an anti-doctrinalist, you preserve your
freedom to decide later cases in ways that you want. Chief Justice
Rehnquist was accused of doing this sort of thing. It’s not that
Rehnquist was an anti-doctrinalist, as somebody pointed out. I think
it was Jonathan in the previous panel. He wrote these very short
opinions in which there wasn’t a lot that you could cite then as a
future precedent. But, I don’t think that’s what Kennedy was up to.
So, I do confess to being a little bit puzzled by some what seemed to
me gratuitous anti-doctrinalism.
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Professor Berger: On your first point about him being more honest
in terms of admitting his value judgements. I think that’s probably
true, in comparison to most of the other Supreme Court Justices. I
don’t think it’s true in comparison to Judge Posner, who I think is the
paragon of candor as a judge.
What I meant when I said he was inscrutable—I guess I meant
three different things. The first is what Mike just referred to, is he
writes these opinions that are so un-doctrinal that it’s hard to know
how they apply in future cases. So, the sex-toys cases in the lower
courts after Lawrence are an example of that. He doesn’t even tell
you what tier of scrutiny, so you don’t know. Is he applying rational
basis, or heightened rational basis, or some kind of heightened
scrutiny, or is he just abandoning the tiers of scrutiny altogether, and
that’s part of why you have that mess. So, it’s inscrutable in terms of
going forward, how is this going to apply?
I think he’s also inscrutable in that there are some cases that you
can certainly justify them and find ways to square them with earlier
decisions, but they were hard to predict, based on earlier things he
did. So, I alluded to Fisher. I thought that was, at least to me,
surprising, after Grutter and Gratz. I think Gonzales v. Carhart is
hard to square with Casey. I mentioned earlier, I think there’s at least
an argument that Janus is hard to square with Garcetti. You can do it,
but it’s hard.
And then the final reason I said he’s inscrutable, and Jamal alluded
to this, he says these things and it’s just hard to know why he thinks
them or why he thinks it’s doing the work he’s doing. So, for
instance, he makes questionable empirical assertions of two different
sorts. One is he’ll cite numbers, but it’s unclear why he thinks they’re
that persuasive. So, Corinna’s written quite a bit about state counting
in the Eighth Amendment area. So, in the Graham case, for instance,
about life in prison without parole for juvenileswho are convicted of
a non-homicide crime, he talks about how the world—public
opinion—is turning against this practice, but then a significant
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majority of states and the District of Columbia, I think it was 37
states, still had it. And there are ways to explain it away:it wasn’t
imposed that often, and the trend seems to be against it. But he seems
to hang a lot on this empirical assertion, but it’s not clear it’s doing
that much work for him.
Then in another case, he makes these empirical assertions without
any evidence at all. So, in Citizens United, he says the populace will
not lose faith in our government because of the corporate influence in
our government. He cites nothing for that. In Gonzales v. Carhart, as
mentioned in the first panel, he makes assertions about women
coming to regret abortions, and that can lead to depression. I think he
cites an amicus brief, but that certainly isn’t strong empirics. So, I
think that’s inscrutable as well. He seems to be putting a lot in these
assertions, but (a) why does he think they’re that important, and (b)
where’s he getting this stuff?
Professor Segall: One way Justice Kennedy I think definitely was a
true judge, in the sense of temperament, was Justice Scalia criticized
him in ways that Scalia used to criticize O’Connor, but O’Connor
wasn’t around as long as Kennedy. And even as far back as 1992, in
Lee v. Weisman, when the court struck down graduation prayers at
high school graduations—and that really did alienate much of the
right—Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion accuses Kennedy of all
kinds of terrible things. And then, of course, in Obergefell he talks
about putting a bag over his head and all that. Justice Kennedy never,
to the best of my knowledge, responded to any of those criticisms—
and there’s many others—those criticisms in the way he could have
with that kind of rhetoric, that kind of tone.
Professor Dorf: What’s he going to say? No, I put a bag over my
head.
Professor Segall: Well, right, but Scalia accused him—I forget the
exact phrase—but Psychology 101 or something in Lee v.
Weisman—
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Professor Dorf: In the same footnote where Scalia says you ought to
put a bag over his head, he also compares the majority opinion to the
inscrutable mysteries of a fortune cookie.
Professor Segall: Right, so here’s my substantive question about this
though. I respect Justice Kennedy for not taking that road, on the one
hand. On the other hand, would his opinions maybe have been, over
the course of time, more durable, more effective in the way that
Scalia’s dissents turned out to be, I think, had he resorted to a little
bit more taking off the gloves and responding to Scalia’s attacks
directly?
Professor Dorf: First of all, I challenge the idea that Scalia’s dissents
are durable. In his Lawrence dissent, Scalia says, “Well, you gay
people control the media, so what do you expect?” I’m not really
exaggerating that.
Now, of course everybody—no one can escape the prejudices of
their age, and so there’s all sorts of stuff that’s not going to hold up.
We teach the first Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy as this great
visionary thing, and we typically don’t talk about the blatantly racist,
anti-Chinese sentiment in there.
So, I’m not sure that’s the right question. I was thinking about this
conference awhile back and thinking that it’s premature to be talking
about Justice Kennedy’s legacy. What will be his legacy? So much
depends on who the next appointment is and the one after that, and
then I thought, in a way, that’s the wrong way to think about it.
Instead, I tried thinking about this the way a historian might. If I
think about the Supreme Court in some earlier period, whether it’s in
the 19th century, the early 20th century, et cetera, part of what I want
to know is how much of the law that they decided is still good law.
But even more than that, I really want to know what does this tell us
about the period in which they lived?
For a period of nearly 30 years, Justice Kennedy was either one of
the two most important people or the most important person for the
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meaning of U.S. law across a wide range of issues. And even if all of
his opinions are overruled, he’ll be an important figure for that. I
don’t really think that answers your question, but I do want to push
back a little bit on this idea that the way we measure a Justice’s
impact is by how many of his or her opinions continue to be good
law a generation later.
Professor Segall: We have about five more minutes before we ask
questions, but I want to say that’s a sophisticated-law-professor way
of looking at it. To gays and lesbians who want rights, how durable
his four opinions are is very important, and I think how he wrote
those opinions may or may not be relevant to their durability, but that
durability is a very important thing.
Professor Dorf: I’m amazed to hear you say that, since you think
doctrine doesn’t matter at the Supreme Court.
Professor Segall: I don’t think doctrine matters at the Supreme
Court. I do think the way the Supreme Court is perceived by the
public matters to future Supreme Court cases, and how justices write
opinions can sometimes, on these big issues, matter to the public.
Eric, you wanted to say something.
Professor Berger: A couple of points. I actually admire Justice
Kennedy for taking the high road, and not—
Professor Segall: Me too.
Professor Berger: I think the Supreme Court does better than the
vast majority of American society disagreeing with some modicum
of respect, but some Justices do better than others, and I admire
Justice Kennedy for not descending to Justice Scalia’s level. I don’t
think that will affect his durability.
I think what might affect how enduring his opinions are as a matter
of law is—and I’m not sure I’m right about this, just sort of throwing
it out there—but because they’re less doctrinal, you’re more likely to
have confusion in the lower courts about how to apply them, and that
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might make them more likely to get up to the Supreme Court, which
could rewrite it, overturn it, or rewrite it in a way different from what
Justice Kennedy intended.
That said—and this is actually a point that I saw that Jamal made
after Justice Kennedy announced his retirement—regardless of how
many of his opinions are still good law, Jamal made the point that he
wrote an incredible number of really important opinions. I think
Jamal said more than anyone since Chief Justice Marshall, and I
think that will probably endure regardless of how the law changes.
He’ll be seen as an incredibly important Justice of this period.
Professor Greene: Along those lines, I guess I also am going to
dissent a little bit from the—I think I’ll dissent generally from the
premise that how Justices write opinions is likely to have very much
effect on the durability of those opinions. I think what the particular
issue is and how they decide it has an effect on durability, and how
society evolves obviously has an effect on durability, but, of course,
as Mike points out, you look at Lawrence v. Texas and Justice
Scalia’s opinion, and we, as law professors, read these things, and so
we develop opinions about them, and Justice Scalia always has a few
putdowns and a few sharp lines, but, of course, Justice Scalia was in
dissent in Lawrence, and in Lawrence then makes a prediction about
if we go down this road same-sex marriage is coming next. You
watch out! And, lo and behold, he’s right about that, and he’s also in
dissent in that case. We just had a panel, which Pam said and Mark
said this is about as durable a precedent as you’re going to get, and it
was decided three years ago. So Justice Kennedy is the winner in that
series notwithstanding that Justice Scalia has some better lines. He
lost.
Professor Segall: That makes sense. Eric, I want to say one thing
about the lower court confusion about non-doctrinal decisions. Mark
Tushnet wrote a long, long time ago about the dormant commerce
clause that some verbal formulations are easier to evade than other
verbal formulations, and federal judges and their law clerks, at the
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district court level especially, are overworked and don’t have endless
time. Legal realists say that how hard it is to avoid a decision you
want to avoid is relevant to whether you’re going to avoid it. So, I
think that might make a difference in the long run for the reasons you
said, that these cases are more easy to litigate in the lower courts, the
more room the lower courts have. Alright. With that, let’s take some
questions from the audience, if we have any questions from the
audience.
Professor Corinna Lain: Corinna Lain—can you hear me?
Professor Segall: Yes.
Professor Lain: Okay, so two brief reactions to that, mainly off of
the last comments. The first is it occurs to me that you’re right.
Kennedy wrote so many of these most important decisions, and I
think it’s because they were 5–4, and they needed Kennedy’s buy in,
and there was some sense of he might not sign on to anything that the
libs are going to write. And so, this comes at the same time that I’m
thinking the moderate, the swing judge, it’s gone. I don’t think we’re
going to have that. I guess Roberts becomes the swing judge, but
that’s not much of a swing. So my question is do you think—and I’ve
got two. Here’s the first one, though: do you think that those days are
over, that there won’t be another great judge or Justice, that can you
say wow, wrote all of these really important opinions, because at this
point we don’t have a middle anymore? And then my second one
goes to Jamal’s point, and it is you said Kennedy won on the
same-sex marriage despite the fact that Scalia had some better lines. I
agree with that. I also agree with the first panel, Mark Tushnet and
Pam, saying this is about as stable as you get. And I think the reason
that’s true is because the Supreme Court was catching up, and the
Supreme Court there was just lagging behind where society was. And
so, I’ve been thinking about the Supreme Court as going down the
tubes now, candidly, but maybe that’s not so. I think what we’re
going to see again is a court that lags behind where society is. And so
maybe by the time they recognize it, we will have more celebrated
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decisions, because society has already passed them by. Anyway,
those are my questions and comments.
Professor Greene: Can I just make two quick points on that? One is
the fact that Justice Kennedy was the swing Justice, I think might
plausibly have had some effect on his writing style. One thing about
Justice Kennedy is, in a lot of the cases, he wasn’t afraid of losing
someone in the case. And so that gives you a lot of freedom to write
in exactly the way you want to write, whereas if you’re worried about
losing some other person or losing Justice Kennedy, you might be
much more careful on how you write.
Just on the point about whether we’re done with swing Justices: of
course, whether someone is a swing Justice depends on what else is
going on in the world. So, if you would ask me, if you had told me all
the things Justice Kennedy does in 1985 and said here’s your swing
Justice. That’s not a swing justice. That’s a pretty conservative
Justice actually. But he becomes a swing Justice, because the rest of
the court also moves over time, and I think it’s quite plausible—who
knows what’ll happen—but quite plausible that you could see
something similar happen in the future. So in the last term of the
Court, the most frequent—so John Roberts was the plus one more
often than Justice Kennedy was. In fact, Justice Kennedy was never
the plus one in cases with the liberals. So all the cases in which the
liberals won 5–4, the other Justices were someone other than Justice
Kennedy. So over time, I could very easily see someone like John
Roberts, who’s looking out for how fast the Court moves in a certain
direction, even as he’s quite conservative himself, looking out for
how fast the Court moves in a certain direction and ending up being a
backstop simply because the rest of the Court is so much further to
the right than it was even when he joined the Court.
Professor Segall: We will be discussing the median Justice idea, the
swing vote idea, in the last panel today.
Professor Dorf: Just on the point of lag: people who have studied the
constitutional history more closely than I have—and I’m thinking
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especially of Barry Friedman’s book The Will of the People as well
as Michael Klarman’s work—conclude that the basic lesson of that
history is that on average the Supreme Court lags, and that makes
sense given the way in which Justices are chosen. The Court
occasionally gets out in front, but when it gets more than about a
standard deviation away from the center of public opinion, it’s
brought back. This view would suggest that the Supreme Court
doctrine is epiphenomenal, that is to say controlled by some other
thing: namely where society as a whole is going. If that’s true,
broadly speaking, then it doesn’t matter that much, so that’s what I
tell myself.
Professor Segall: Barry Friedman just said a few months ago that he
thinks this new Court is going to be way, way, standard deviations
away from—
Professor Dorf: If he’s right about lessons of history, then
eventually it’ll get reined in.
Matthew Haan: Hi, I’m Matthew Haan. I’m a member of the Law
Review here. Y’all took some time at the beginning talking about
who you think Justice Kennedy was writing for in certain cases, and
I’m wondering if you have any opinions about who Supreme Court
Justices, in general, should write for, if anyone, and whether that
changes based on the issue presented to them.
Professor Berger: I think in a way they’re writing for lots of
different people, and that’s what makes it a hard job. I think they do
have some role to provide instructions to lawyers and lower court
judges about how to apply the doctrine in future cases. The legal
realist critique that Eric makes very well might be correct, but at the
end of the day there are going to be future cases, and lower courts are
going to have to decide them.
On the other hand, the law is important—it’s so important that you
can’t leave it to just lawyers. So I do think there’s some sense in
writing for the general public and writing in ways so that someone
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who picks up a newspaper and is just reading snippets of the opinion
can follow.
Professor Dorf: At a minimum I think all judges should be writing
for the parties in the case and especially for the losing party. Okay,
you lost this case, but I’m going to try to justify it to you. This goes
to this question about graciousness and the non-response to Justice
Scalia. One reason not to be too snarky, or catty, or worse, to make
jokes in an opinion, is that somebody’s going to lose this case, and
for them, if they think it’s been treated as a joke, that’s pretty bad.
Professor Mark Tushnet: Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School. I
want to get back to the starting point about prose style and bring in
something that Michael suggested, which is that it might be valuable
to historicize the prose style issues. So one way to think—there’s this
great essay by Edmund Wilson about Oliver Wendell Holmes called
‘The Chasing of American Prose Style,’ and he tries to historicize
why Holmes wrote the way he did. So this is really a shorthand
version of this, but think about four Justices and how you might
historicize their prose style.
This is really shorthand, so Justice Scalia is talk radio, and Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan are NPR. What’s weird about
Justice Kennedy’s prose style is that it’s some author from the late
19th century. Not that in the late 19th century the way he wrote
would have been strange, it’s just that now it is a little. And this
connects to the audience that is the people, all of us today, are located
today, and we read things as contemporaries, and so if you are
appealing to any body of contemporaries you have to write in a way
that corresponds to one of the modes of communication available to
that. And, again, this is—in some ways, it connects to the antidoctrinalism or the opacity of the reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s
opinions, because they don’t communicate in a way that is effective
for contemporary audiences, even if you can look at them and rework
them to make them effective communications. That’s an observation.
Professor Dorf: Can I say one thing about this?
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Professor Segall: Yes.
Professor Dorf: That strikes me as exactly right. One thing that
puzzles me a little bit is why Justice David Souter never got the same
level of criticism on this particular point, because he also wrote like
he was living in the 19th century. I think there’s an opinion in which
Souter uses the word ‘enquiry’, which he was very fond of doing,
with an E, and Scalia in dissent quotes it. I don’t remember whether
he writes “[sic]” next to it, but it’s as if he does. But Souter got a pass
on his style, perhaps because he wasn’t seen as that important in
terms of the Court’s substantive dynamics.
Professor Segall: Last question. Yes?
Lawrence Ashe: Lawrence Ashe. Curiosity question relating to
Scalia’s noted snarkiness and Kennedy’s fire to fire back: Scalia and
Ginsburg are notoriously good friends off the bench. Their families
travel together, play poker, and so forth. What was the relationship,
on a personal level, between Kennedy and Scalia?
Professor Segall: Do we know?
Professor Dorf: They were neighbors. I think it’s a little bit like
Blackmun and Burger. That is, they were close initially, and then
they kind of drifted apart.
Professor Segall: There is a story—I do not know if it’s true, maybe
Mike does—that Scalia did accost Kennedy verbally outside of his
house after—it was either Casey or Lee v. Weisman. I don’t
remember which one, but we’ll let that sit there.
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